Abstract-With high expansibility and efficient power usage, tiered wireless sensor networks are widely deployed in many fields as an important part of Internet of Things (IoTs). It is challenging to process range query while protecting sensitive data from adversaries. Moreover, most existing work focuses on privacy-preserving range query neglecting collusion attacks and probability attacks, which are more threatening to network security. In this paper, we first propose a secure range query protocol called secRQ, which not only protects data privacy, but also resists collusion attacks and probability attacks in tiered wireless sensor networks. Generalized inverse matrices and distance-based range query mechanism are used to guarantee security as well as high efficiency and accuracy. Besides, we propose the mutual verification scheme to verify the integrity of query results. Finally, both theoretical analysis and experimental results confirm the security, efficiency and accuracy of secRQ.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an indispensable building part of Internet of Things (IoTs), wireless sensor network (WSN) has been widely used in many applications, including smart home, e-health and environment monitoring. Most existing large-scale WSNs follow a tiered architecture [1] as shown in Fig.1 , which consists of a large amount of resource-limited sensor nodes in the lower tier and several resource-rich storage nodes in the upper tier. Sensor nodes are mainly responsible for sensing, while storage nodes store data received from sensor nodes and answer queries received from the sink. There are several advantages of the tiered WSNs. On the one hand, sensor nodes can save much energy and avoid communication bottleneck by sending data to their closest storage nodes instead of the sink [2] , meanwhile, it can also reduce storage cost. On the other hand, the query processing becomes more efficient since the sink only needs to communicate with several storage nodes rather than a large amount of sensor nodes [3] . Therefore, the tiered architecture is favorable for extending capacity and improving scalability of WSNs.
However, this architecture also brings in some security risks. Since storage nodes are responsible for storing data and processing queries, they are more liable to be compromised. Once compromising a storage node, the adversary can obtain all sensitive data under an unencrypted format, which seriously violates data privacy. Moreover, the adversary can manipulate the compromised storage node to submit damaged (e.g. fake or incomplete) results, which breaches result integrity. As a result, it is challenging to preserve data privacy and result integrity as well as achieving efficient performance and precise results.
Range query is one of the most important queries in WSNs. A privacy-preserving range query processing protocol should protect sensitive data and actual queries from adversaries. For example, considering the privacy requirements for patients in e-health, each wearable health monitor device is a sensor node to collect the patient's physical signs, such as heart rate, blood pressure, body temperature. Due to the limitation of power and storage capacity, these health monitors send the physical signs to the medical storage nodes at the specified epoch. When the doctor intends to know the blood pressure information of tachycardia patients whose normal heart rates are between 100bpm and 120bpm, he can propose a query range [100bpm, 120bpm] to the sink, and the sink will send the range query to the medical storage nodes. In this case, two crucial items are expected to be protected from adversaries. One is sensitive data, e.g. the patients' physical signs sensed by health monitors (treated as data privacy of sensor nodes), and the other is actual query, e.g. the query range [100bpm, 120bpm] (treated as data privacy of users) proposed by the doctor. If the adversaries capture the query range, at least they can know (1) what the doctor concerns about (2) the physical signs in the result corresponds to persons whose heart rates are between 100bmp and 120bmp. Therefore, sensitive data and actual queries should not be transmitted explicitly.
To defend attacks, the conventional way is to apply encryption on sensitive data and to construct characteristic values (e.g. data range prefix [4] , Bloom filter code [5] ) for sensitive data and actual queries. Storage nodes can process range queries on these characteristic values without knowing sensitive data and actual queries. Most existing secure range query protocols [4] - [9] only study privacy preservation when storage nodes are compromised. Work [10] first focused on collusion attacks for range queries in tiered WSNs, but it did not consider probability attacks. In fact, collusion attacks [11] and probability attacks [12] are becoming increasingly common in WSNs.
Collusion attack means that the adversary captures many nodes. Consider a special situation where the adversary captures some sensor nodes and their storage node. The adversary can deduce more information to break the network security according to algorithms in sensor nodes and stored data items in storage node. For instance, the adversary compromises one health monitor and the corresponding medical storage node, gets the characteristic value construction of heart rate from the compromised health monitor, and then recovers the heart rate of other patients stored in the compromised medical storage nodes. Probability attacks in WSNs are based on (1) historical or prior knowledge, and (2) the uniform one-to-one privacypreserving characteristic value construction, leading to that each data item has a unique fixed characteristic value. The adversary can not only find out the corresponding relationships between data (or query) and their characteristic value by means of probability matching, but also exploit pairs of sensitive data item and its characteristic value to crack charactergenerated function to recover other data items. Due to the historical knowledge that the doctor constantly concerns about the tachycardia patients whose heart rates are between 100bpm and 120bpm, the adversary can decide which characteristic value is most likely to represent [100bpm, 120bpm] according to frequency statistics in the compromised medical storage node.
A robust range query protocol in WSNs should consider as much kinds of attack as possible to enhance resistance under the premise of high efficiency and accuracy. Besides, integrity verification mechanism also becomes a hot research topic. Thus, how to achieve high precision and efficient performance while resisting to adversaries even under collusion attacks and probability attacks, and how to design an efficient integrity verification to detect damaged results, are significant for the development of WSNs. In this paper, we propose a secure range query processing protocol called secRQ in tiered WSNs. Our secRQ can resist the typical and risky attacks in WSNs, such as plaintext attacks, collusion attacks and probability attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to consider collusion attacks as well as probability attacks for range queries in tiered WSNs. Our secRQ consumes less communication cost than the latest work [10] , and achieves 100% accuracy. Furthermore, we propose the mutual verification scheme that allows the sink to verify the integrity of query results. The mutual verification scheme achieves stronger scalability than existing prior integrity verification schemes [4] and [9] for range queries in tiered WSNs.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the related work. Models and goals of secure range query are described in Section III. Section IV introduces our basic secRQ protocol for 1-dimensional data. We extend the basic secRQ for multi-dimensional data in Section V. The mutual verification scheme for integrity verification is elaborated in Section VI. We analyze secRQ in terms of complexity, privacy and integrity in Section VII. Section VIII evaluates secRQ. We conclude this paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
The problem of privacy and integrity preserving range query in tiered WSNs has been investigated in work [4] - [10] . Sheng et al. proposed a verifiable privacy-preserving range query protocol in tiered WSNs [6] . The protocol divides the domain of data value into multiple disjoint buckets. When a range query comes, the sink converts the query to a set of bucket IDs covering the required range and sends the IDs to storage nodes, then storage nodes returns the encrypted data items in these buckets to the sink. This bucket technique may bring in a large number of false positives and cause high communication cost. It can be hardly extended to solve multidimensional range query.
To address this problem, Chen et al. presented SafeQ, a secure and efficient range query processing protocol [4] , [7] . It uses prefix membership verification scheme [13] to represent each sensed data ranges, and then utilizes the method in [14] to ensure data privacy and puts forward neighborhood chain to protect integrity. However, it demands much computation and communication.
Zhang et al. proposed ESRQ, an efficient and secure range query protocol for 1-dimensional range query in tiered WSNs [5] . ESRQ utilizes Bloom filter technique to encode sensed data items and queries, and processes range queries according to Bloom filter membership test. Li et al. proposed BBP, a broadcast-based protocol for multi-dimensional range query in sensor network [8] . It constructs an individual Bloom filter for each dimension. The storage nodes in BBP are credible and regarded as converters to form different ranges for different dimensions. Due to false positives brought by Bloom filter, both ESRQ and BBP cannot provide precise query results.
Yi et al. proposed an order preserving function-based protocol [9] . The protocol uses two monotone increasing functions pf (x, i) and Qf (x, y) to encode sensor data items and issued range queries respectively. This protocol cannot defend against node collusion. The reason is that pf (x, i) and Qf (x, y) share the same main body, and the degree of pf (x, i) cannot be large due to limitation of sensor node's ability.
Collusion attack was first considered in work [10] . Confusion-based collusion-aware privacy-preserving range query protocol (c-CPRQ) and l-uncertainty collusion-aware privacy-preserving range query (u-CPRQ), were proposed to process privacy-preserving range query based on Bloom filter. The basic idea of these protocols is that different sensor nodes have different hash functions to encode data items, which prevents sensor nodes from deducing data items of other nodes. The storage node processes range queries according to Bloom filter membership test. c-CPRQ may generates unallowed false negatives, which means the storage may filter out some data items that are actually in the range. u-CPRQ overcomes this shortage of c-CPRQ while producing more false positives.
In existing secure range query protocols, data integrity has also attracted much attention. Multi-dimensional neighborhood chains [4] are used to preserve the integrity of multidimensional data, but it needs to be assisted by the vulnerable and unbelievable storage nodes. Yi et al. [9] proposed a link watermarking scheme to check 1-dimensional data integrity and designed a data structure called multi-dimensional neighbor tree (MDNT) to validate the integrity for multidimensional data. Nevertheless, MDNT excessively increases communication overhead and energy consumption, and it is built in storage nodes, which are not reliable. Chen et al. put forward a new data structure called local bit matrices to detect the damaged results with high probability [15] in cloud computing, but the structure overly depends on the data reasonable distribution. Only when the data distribution draws on the partition buckets, can the bit matrices accurately examine the loss of data.
III. MODELS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Network Model
We consider a typical tiered sensor network as shown in Fig.1 . Copious resource-limited sensor nodes are responsible for sensing data in the lower layer. Storage nodes in the upper layer store data received from sensor nodes, process queries received from the sink and reply results to the sink. The sink interacts with users and issues queries to the storage nodes. The network is partitioned into several regions. Each region contains a storage node and some sensor nodes. When the sink receives a query from a user, it transforms the query to a new format and then sends it to storage nodes in the specified regions. While receiving the transformed query, storage nodes process the query over stored data and return the requested data satisfying the range query to the sink. Finally the sink checks the results and replies data to the user.
B. Adversary Model
We assume that the adversary aims at obtaining sensitive data of sensor nodes and actual queries of users. According to work [4] - [10] , the sink is reliable. Oppositely, sensor nodes and storage nodes are unreliable. A single compromised sensor node only leaks its own data items while a compromised storage nodes may leak more information (e.g. stored data items received from sensor nodes and queries received from the sink). What is worse, a compromised storage node may be manipulated to reply fake or incomplete results to the sink. Furthermore, it is worth noting two harmful attacks. One is collusion attack, where a compromised storage node cooperates with one or more compromised sensor nodes to steal more information. More specifically, if all sensor nodes in the same region share unified parameters of the query protocol, the adversary can have high level knowledge, (e.g., algorithm, parameters) of the query processing mechanism and the privacy-preserving scheme through compromised sensor nodes, and can use the knowledge to recover sensitive data items stored in the storage node. The other is probability attack. The adversary guesses the true values with high probabilities according to the additional knowledge e.g. common sense and distribution frequencies and then gets the characteristic values and recovers sensitive data. In this paper, we mainly focus on (1) preventing sensitive data items and actual queries from compromised storage nodes, (2) resisting collusion attacks and probability attacks and (3) detecting fake and incomplete results.
C. Design Requirements
The fundamental problem in this paper is: how to design the range query processing protocol in a privacy-integritypreserving manner that can resist collusion attacks and probability attacks? The protocol should achieve the following goals.
• Query and data privacy. Query privacy means that the storage nodes cannot derive the actual query range. Similarly, data privacy means that the actual data items sensed by sensor node S should only be learned by S and the sink under collusion attacks. In addition, the scheme should prevent the adversary from one-to-one mapping relationship between characteristic values and sensitive data items and that between transformed queries and actual queries.
• Query process efficiency and accuracy. Energy is the bottleneck of sensor network development. Work in [16] indicates that communication consumes much more energy than other operations. Hence, the less communication overhead, the higher efficiency. Besides, accuracy is an important quality metric of range query protocols. The higher accuracy, the better protocol.
• Result integrity. Since a compromised storage node may reply fake or incomplete results, it is necessary to design an integrity verification mechanism for the sink to detect damaged results.
D. Notations
To make our paper easier to follow, we first summarize the main notations used in our paper as shown in Table. I. In this section, we elaborate our basic privacy-preserving range query protocol secRQ for 1-dimensional data. Then we will extend this basic model for multi-dimensional data in Section V.
A. Overview
Our basic range query protocol is based on the distance comparison rule. The distance-based query model is described as follows. For 1-dimensional range R = [a, b], we use r mid , r bou to represent R, where r mid denotes the middle point value of R, that is r mid = (a + b)/2, and r bou denotes an arbitrary bound of R, that is r bou = a or r bou = b. Fig.2 shows the idea of distance comparison. The basic idea of our 1-dimensional privacy-preserving range query processing is detailed as follows. We assume that in the network of N sensor nodes, the sensor node ) and so on. Then the sink randomly distributes these generalized inverse matrices to all sensor nodes in the network, and each sensor node is assigned one or more different M , which are represent by M i . The distribution should guarantee that M i can only be known by S i . Since the sink knows all secret keys, one possible method is that the sink allocates (M i ) ki instead of M i (each sensor node has a built-in k i shares with the sink). As a result, routing topology is determined and all sensor nodes obtain their matrices M i . The sink also owns some generalized inverse matrices of W s , which are represented by M s .
Fig. 2: Distance Comparison
Theorem 1. (Distance Comparison Rule) For a 1-dimensional range R = [a, b], let r mid = (a + b)/2 and r bou = a. A 1- dimensional data item d is in R ifS i (1 i N ) senses n data items d i,1 , . . . , d i,
Suppose that S i collects n data items
2 ) for d i,j and then randomly selects one M i from its own matrices to construct characteristic value cv i,j through Equation (2) . 
where || means concatenation and MV i,j is the integrity verification information for d i,j (detailed in Section VI).
C. Range Parameters Transformation
Now
2 ). Then the sink constructs tr mid and tr bou according to Equation (3) and (4).
tr mid is a 3-dimensional column vector and tr bou is a 3-dimensional row vector. For instance, a user proposes a query range [4, 12] , the sink first computes r mid = 8, r bou = 4, and then transforms 8, 4 into (20, 52, 50) T , (-11, 9, -4) using where T is the user-specified time segment.
D. Comparison Function
Both the construction of characteristic values and the transformation for range parameters mentioned above are steppingstones to the comparison function for cv, tr mid and tr bou at storage nodes. When the storage node ST receives the range query message, it first picks out the messages received from sensor nodes at epoch t (t ∈ T ). ST filters these messages according to Theorem 2 which guarantees the correctness of comparison. Proof: Note that
Since u mid > 0, according to Theorem 1, the condition is equivalent to
According to Theorem 2, we can see our secRQ is a precise range query processing. We call (cv i,j − tr bou ) · tr mid the range-criterion of d i,j . In the previous examples, the range-criterion of data 2 is 
We can extend the basic 1-dimensional secRQ protocol in Section IV to z-dimensional secRQ protocol. 
Because M i is a 2 × 3 matrix, CV i,j is a z × 3 matrix. The message that S i sends to the storage node ST is
where MV i,j is the integrity verification information for D i,j .
When a user proposes a z-dimensional range query R z , the sink first computes parameters r l mid , r l bou for each dimension of R z , then builds two matrices Q mid and Q bou through Equation (6) and Equation (7) .
where each u l mid is a random positive number. Then the sink transforms Q min , Q bou into T R mid , T R bou according to Equation (8) and (9) .
The message that the sink sends to storage node ST is
the sink → ST : T, T R mid , TR bou
While receiving the range query and picking out the data messages satisfying the time segment T , ST filters messages according to Theorem 3. (5), (8) and (9), respectively. D i,j is in R z if and only if all the elements on main diagonal of
Obviously, the main diagonal element in the l-th row of (CV i,j − T R bou ) · T R mid is the range-criterion of the l-th dimension. Theorem 3 is a dimensional extension of Theorem 2. Thus secRQ is also precise under multi-dimensional range queries. After all messages are checked, ST merges all
are all non-negative} into RS and returns RS to the sink.
We summarize the whole privacy-preserving range query processing in Protocol 1.
Protocol 1. secRQ for z-dimensional Data
• Network initialization phase: The sink secretly generates a non-singular 3 × 2 matrix W s , and allocates 2 × 3 matrices M i satisfying Equation (1) to each sensor nodes.
• Data-sensing phase: Suppose S i collects D i,1 , . . . , D i,n at epoch t. For each data item D i,j , S i generates integrity verification information MV i,j (detailed in Section VI) and then computes CV i,j according to Equation (5). After encryption, S i sends data message
• Query-proposing phase: For a range query T, R z , the sink computes parameters r l mid , r l bou for the lth dimension range and transforms these parameters to T R mid , T R bou according to Equation (8) 
and (9). Then it sends T, T R mid , T R bou to ST .
• Query-processing phase: Receiving T, T R mid , T R bou , ST first picks out the messages satisfying t ∈ T , then computes range-criterions and filters messages according to Theorem 3. Finally, ST merges all RS i = {i, (D i,j ||MV i,j ) ki |the main diagonal elements in (CV i,j − T R bou ) · T R mid are all non-negative} into RS and sends RS to the sink.
VI. DATA INTEGRITY VERIFICATION FOR RANGE QUERY PROCESSING
In a malicious environment, storage nodes may be compromised to reply damaged (fake or incomplete) results to the sink, which makes users receive the damaged result and influences the correctness of users' decision. As a result, it is necessary to verify data integrity of results. Data integrity generally refers to two aspects. One is that the final result should not include forged data items, the other is that the final result should not exclude any data item satisfying the query. To check the integrity, we present a novel verification scheme called mutual verification via constructing specific relationships between any two data items. In the following, we first give some definitions used in our integrity verification scheme, and then elaborate the mutual verification scheme based upon these definitions. To ease representation, sensor node ID i is omitted in some place.
A. Definitions
For clear description, we define three important definitions: combined space, pure relationship and mutual verification object. We will use these definitions to verify integrity in the mutual verification scheme. 
1) Combined Space:
Considering two z-dimensional data items denoted as D α (d 1 α , . . . , d z α ) and D β (d 1 β , . . . , d z β ), we can establish a combined space CS α,β = ([d 1 α , d 1 β ], . . . , [d z α , d z β ]). If d l α > d l β , the sensor node changes [d l α , d l β ] to [d l β , d l α ].
3) Mutual Verification Object:
The mutual verification object MV j of the data item D j is defined as the data set in which each data item has pure relationship with D j . For example, in Fig.4 ,
B. Mutual Verification Scheme
Now we describe how to use mutual verification scheme to verify the integrity of query result in sensor nodes, storage nodes and the sink respectively.
1) Sensor nodes:
Sensor nodes are responsible for generating and embedding mutual verification objects into the original data items. S computes MV j for each data item D j collected at each epoch t. Then S sends (D j ||MV j ) k to its storage node ST . Fig.5 shows that the sensor node S collects data items Fig.4 . S encrypts each data item D j and MV j together, and submits
Fig. 5: 2-dimensional Range Query
2) Storage node: ST processes range query
and returns RS to the sink according to Protocol 1. In Fig.5 , given R 2 = ( [4, 10] , [1, 9] ), then
3) The sink: Upon receiving RS, the sink decrypts RS to restore DS and V S, where DS denotes the plaintext data set containing D j , and V S denotes the mutual verification object set containing MV j . In Fig.5 ,
The sink verifies the query result integrity following three principles: (a) According to DS and V S, get the original data distribution. Since secRQ is a precise range query protocol, if any data item in DS does not satisfy the query range R z , the query result is damaged. 
is deleted in storage node ST , the sink can detect the loss of
VII. ANALYSIS
A. Complexity Analysis
We mainly analyze computation complexity. Suppose there are N sensor nodes, each sensor node collects n z-dimensional data items at epoch t. We divide the range query processing into four phases as shown in Protocol 1 to analyze complexity.
• Network initialization phase: The sink allocates M to each sensor node, the complexity is O(N ).
• Data-sensing phase: The complexity of computing characteristic value is O(1), thus for n z-dimensional data items, the total complexity is O(zn). Similarly, the complexity of integrity verification construction is O(zn).
• Query-proposing phase: For a z-dimensional range query, the sink first computes r • Query-processing phase: The storage node ST checks each characteristic value received from sensor nodes, and the complexity of this phase is O(zn).
B. Privacy Analysis
We analyze the privacy-preserving ability of secRQ in the following aspects.
• Sensor node is compromised. Since the adversary only knows the data items of the compromised sensor node, this case has little influence on network security. Even if the adversary obtains characteristic value construction, it does not know the characteristic values of other sensor nodes' sensitive data as well as the transformed queries. This case does not threaten the security of the network.
• Storage node is compromised. The adversary can obtain (D i,j ) ki , CV i,j and T R mid , T R bou . Since the adversary does not know
Without knowing characteristic value construction, the adversary cannot recover data item D i,j from CV i,j . Similarly, Q mid and Q bou are unrecoverable due to the lack of range parameters transformation. Therefore a single compromised storage node has little effect on data privacy and query privacy in our scheme. A compromised storage node may return fake and incomplete results, we will demonstrate that our integrity verification can detect fake results in next subsection.
• Collusion attack. Since the sink is credible in our system model, the adversary does not know the generation rule of M as shown in Equation (1). Two cases should be considered under collusion attacks. One case is that the adversary compromises some sensor nodes. The adversary does not know characteristic values of other sensor nodes' sensitive data, so this case is similar to the first aspect and has little influence on network security. The other case is that the adversary compromises both sensor nodes and their storage node. Although the adversary obtains characteristic value construction from compromised sensor nodes, each sensor nodes holds different M , and the adversary cannot deduce M of other sensor nodes from these compromised sensor nodes without knowing generation rule of M . Without knowing M of other sensor nodes, the adversary cannot know the sensitive data items from their characteristic values. Although the adversary knows the comparison function (CV i,j − T R bou ) · T R mid , it cannot deduce the range parameters transformation from this comparison function, therefore Q mid and Q bou are still unrecoverable.
• Probability attack. Our protocol is under many-tomany model, that is, each data item has some different one characteristic values, and different data items may generate the same characteristic value, so do the query range and transformed query matrices. The sink and each sensor node may have one or more M , and they can randomly choose different M to compute T R bou and CV . Thus same r bou or same data items may have different T R bou or CV . Similarly, to resist probability attacks, the sink can build different T R mid via using different u l mid .
C. Integrity Analysis
In mutual verification scheme, the sink can correctly verify the integrity of query results. One data item D must exist in mutual verification object of other data items which have pure relationships with D. Meanwhile, the mutual verification scheme has strong scalability, which is not only adaptable to 1-dimensional data, but also highly suitable for multidimensional data. For 1-dimensional data, the mutual verification scheme is analogous to neighborhood chains [4] . For multi-dimensional data, due to the definition of combined space, our scheme can be extended to multiple dimensions. There is a mutual verification object for each multidimensional data item for checking integrity.
In this paper, two types of integrity attacks are taken into consideration. First, fake data items may be inserted into RS. In our scheme, because MV j is attached to data item D j and encrypted before submission, it is impossible for the compromised storage node to falsify D j with correct MV j without knowing the secret key. Second, some data items may be deleted from RS. Next, we give the theoretical analysis and proof to confirm the mutual verification scheme can detect this illegal deletion. Only when the query result strictly abides by principles (a), (b), (c) in Section VI.B, can the sink assure the integrity of result. Principle (a) and (b) allow the sink to check whether each decrypted data item in RS satisfies the query range R. Principle (c) enables the sink to verify if some data items satisfying the query range are removed illegally. Principles (a), (b) and the first two cases in Principle (c) are facile to understand. We mainly prove the third case in Principle (c) with Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, i.e., both Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 are under the condition that more data items than one are in DS. 
It is contradictory to the assumption.
It is also similar to the condition before. On the analogy of this,
(iii) Owing to the total order [18] of combined space, we obtain that 
According to Theorem 4, we know that any D i (D i ∈ DS) can not be isolated, i.e., ∀D i ∈ DS, ∃D j ∈ DS, j = i, D i ∈ MV j . Thus we have DS ⊂ DS . Therefore, if DS is complete, DS = DS . Now we discuss the detection probability of the misbehavior that a storage node removes data items from the query result. Because the original data items have been encrypted and each mutual verification object MV j of data item D j has been attached, the only option left for the adversary is deleting all the data items and their corresponding mutual verification objects. Let A i denote the event that data item D i in the query result is removed. The detection probability is not 100% if and only if every data item D i and its corresponding MV i in RS are all deleted. Therefore, the detection probability can be formulated as:
The above analysis demonstrates that the mutual verification scheme can detect fake and incomplete results with high probability and strong scalability.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate secure range query processing secRQ in terms of communication cost and accuracy. We compare our secRQ with u-CPRQ [10] , which can also We implement these protocols on OMNet++4.1 [20] , and our 2-dimensional data set comes from Grand-St-Bernard Deployment [21] , a small SensorScope network which deployed at the Great St. Bernard Pass between Switzerland and Italy to monitor meteorology.
The area of the network is set to 400m × 400m. We use the number of sensor nodes to represent network size. Sensor nodes are uniformly deployed in the network. Assume the network is separated into 4 identical regions and a storage node is placed at the center of each region. The transmission radius of each sensor node is 50m. Without loss of generality, we use 2-dimensional data items and each domain is [0, 100]. Thus the domain length of each dimension is 100. We use 128-bit Data Encryption Standard (DES) as the data encryption. In addition, for u-CPRQ, we use conditions as in [10] , i.e. the Bloom filter is 128-bit, the hash function number of the sink is 4 and at least 3 hash functions are distributed to each sensor node. To reduce false positives, u-CPRQ is improved by setting w = 2 where w means the number of Bloom filter used for range query. Although this improvement does not increase communication cost of both sensor nodes and storage nodes, it introduces more computation cost to storage nodes.
Our experiment is under format-transmission, which means except sensor node IDs and epoch t (both are 8-bit), other data items should transmitted in either integer format (32-bit) or float format (32-bit). Unless otherwise stated, the network size N =400, epoch t=30s, range proportion (the proportion of |b − a| to each domain length) is 40%. We generated 200 random range queries for each turn.
A. Communication
In WSNs, communication is the dominant factor to consume energy which affects network lifetime. Since the sink is resource-rich, the communication cost produced by the sink is not be considered. Communication cost is usually measured by the number of bits or bytes transmitted from sensor nodes to storage nodes and that transmitted from storage nodes to the sink, i.e. communication cost of sensor nodes and that of storage nodes. Fig.6 and Fig.7 show the impact of network size and epoch on communication cost respectively. It can be observed that the communication cost of these protocols increases with network size and epoch, and secRQ consumes less communication than u-CPRQ. The reason is given as follows. Larger network size means more data items are collected by sensor nodes and transmitted to storage nodes, and larger epoch means sensor nodes upload more data items to storage node in each submission. Under format-transmission, u-CPRQ should use at least three numbers to represent Bloom filter code of each data and extra two Bloom filter codes as bounds of the message, and w used in u-CPRQ does not affect the communication cost of sensor nodes. By contrast, secRQ only uses a 3-dimensional vector to represent each data item. Therefore secRQ consumes less communication cost of sensor nodes. In u-CPRQ, storage nodes return each eligible encrypted data item as well as their Bloom filter codes to the sink to verify data integrity. When w = 1, u-CPRQ also produces false positives which further increase communication cost of storage nodes. In secRQ, the storage nodes do not return characteristic values since the integrity verification information is embedded into the encrypted data items, thus secRQ reduces the communication cost for storage nodes. Fig.8 shows the impact of range proportion on communication cost. Given the fixed network size and epoch, range proportion does not affect communication cost of sensor nodes. It can be seen that our secRQ consumes less communication cost than u-CPRQ. the reason is similar to that in Fig.6 and Fig.7 . Larger range proportion means more data items satisfy the range query, therefore storage nodes return a larger result set RS to the sink. For storage nodes, besides smaller result set structure, secRQ is precise while u-CPRQ has false positives. It is related to the result accuracy, which is discussed in next subsection. Therefore secRQ consumes less communication cost of storage nodes under different range proportions.
B. Accuracy
In our experiment, we define false positive rate as the ratio of the number of unsatisfactory data items in the result to the number of data items in the result. Obviously, higher false positive rate means lower accuracy. Fig.9 shows the impact of network size and range proportion on false positive rate. Our experiment results show that the impact of epoch on false positive rate is similar to the impact of network size, therefore we just exhibit the impact of network size. From Fig.9 we can see that secRQ has no false positive as well as u-CPRQ when w = 2. Fig.9(a) shows that false positive rates of these protocols are stable under different network sizes. Fig.9(b) exhibits the impact of range proportion on false positive rate. According to Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, secRQ is a precise range query protocol which has no false positive. However, range proportion concerns the number of data items included in Bloom filter codes of queries. u-CPRQ may have false positives due to the property of Bloom filter [22] . When w = 2, u-CPRQ can also be a precise range query protocol [10] . Evaluation results in Fig.9 also confirm the accuracy of secRQ.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a secure and efficient range query protocol secRQ that can resist collusion attacks and probability attacks in tiered WSNs. secRQ preserves data privacy, enables storage nodes to process range queries precisely and supports the sink to defend against compromised storage nodes even if the network faces collusion attacks and probability attacks. Besides, we propose mutual verification scheme to verify the validity of query results. Thorough analysis and simulation results confirm the high performance of secRQ in terms of privacy preservation, integrity detection, efficiency and accuracy.
